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of a process of primitive accumulation comparable to the sell-off of 
monastic lands under Henry VIII. The passage of the land, buildings, 
and mills of the Church into the hands of the bourgeoisie, and their 
transformation into productive capital, constituted the keystone of 
the French capitalism that issued from the Revolution, but it scarcely 
registers with Sprang.
Sprang does understand the relationship between the dearth of 
money and the creation of private money in the form of the so-called 
billets de confiance. She rightly points out the connection between 
the creation of these local currencies and the initial belief in the 
decentralization of money and banking. She properly notes the fact 
that consolidation of the assignats as national money arose out of a 
popular reaction against private banking, to which the Jacobins, in 
particular, responded. On the other hand, she considers the assignats 
a failure, while the political reality is that the assignats succeeded 
in that printing them allowed the Revolution’s political and social 
gains to be consolidated. In revolutions, the short-term (that is, polit-
ical considerations) trump the economic long-term. She misses the 
importance of the conflict between the private bankers trying to hold 
onto their privileges and the demand of the sans-culottes for productive 
work and sound money as keys to the revolutionary struggle compel-
ling financial capital to link with productive capital. As a result, she 
judges the Terror as essentially negative and as a result of popular 
panic, and does not realize its creative part in helping to force finan-
cial and industrial capital together.
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Daniel Amsterdam’s Roaring Metropolis: Businessmen’s Campaign 
for a Civic Welfare State challenges the conventional narrative of 
early twentieth-century American businessmen as promoting laissez- 
faire or antistatist politics. Instead, as Amsterdam argues, elite busi-
ness leaders campaigned vigorously for greater municipal spending 
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on civic welfare projects, which included building and improving 
public schools, public health infrastructure, parks and playgrounds, 
libraries, and museums. Rather than focus on national-level business- 
in-government, his narrative traverses multiple cities (Detroit, Phil-
adelphia, and Atlanta) to demonstrate both the diversity of political 
challenges and institutional constraints that civic-minded reformers 
faced as well as the striking convergence of civic welfare policies in 
the 1920s. At times, business leaders worked with an array of polit-
ically active groups—such as local unions, middle-class women’s 
organizations, immigrant groups, African American activists, and 
even the KKK—to achieve their goals. By weaving together this varie-
gated tapestry of people and places, Amsterdam explains how the 
business elite in each of these cities pursued a similar “network of 
programs” to “foster social and political stability as well as economic 
growth” (1). The civic welfare state thus emerged from business elites 
blending urban reform and boosterism in pursuit of development, 
while simultaneously solidifying their own positions of political 
power, embracing “inegalitarian politics” (178), and reshaping their 
urban environment in their own interests.
The book is organized into five chapters, the first of which chron-
icles how the urban reform movement reconfigured city governance 
and empowered business elites in the decade before the armistice. 
Generally, these municipal reforms “weaken[ed] local political machines 
or dilute[d] the strength of the working class vote” (15) while enabling 
business leaders to pursue government spending on their chosen civic 
welfare projects. Generally, after World War I, businessmen’s advocacy 
of civic welfare projects eclipsed their interest in municipal reform. 
Amsterdam attributes that shift to the continued population growth 
that strained municipal services, the pent-up demand due to war-
time controls, and the rise of labor activism and strikes. By 1919 
these events created “an acute urban crisis” (49), which galvanized 
new political alliances and reoriented political priorities “for social 
spending as arguably never before” (7).
The heart of the book, comprising Chapters 2–4, provides detailed 
studies of civic welfare projects in Detroit, Philadelphia, and Atlanta 
through the 1920s. Due to the advantageous municipal reforms that 
preceded the war, Detroit’s commercial and industrial elite easily 
used the city council to allocate funds for their favored development 
projects, and they deployed the Detroit Citizens’ League to organize 
and campaign for electoral support. Despite brief challenges forged 
by organized laborers, immigrant groups, or the KKK, no effective 
interest group emerged to rival business elites. In turn, the major pub-
lic improvement projects sponsored by business-guided groups sailed 
through citywide referenda, approving high levels of debt spending. 
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These “‘immense bond issues’” (56) funded sewer and water systems 
as well as roads and sidewalks, and contributed to “residential 
decentralization” (57) that elites supported because it reduced 
urban density, fostered “a suburbanesque lifestyle,” and tampered the 
“vice, crime, and political radicalism” (57) that they feared. Detroit’s 
Citizens’ League and Board of Commerce achieved their City Beautiful 
goals but also facilitated racial segregation and excluded other cit-
izen groups from governance—trends highlighted in each of these 
case studies.
Philadelphia’s business elite, operating through its chamber of 
commerce, pursued quite similar infrastructure projects in water and 
sewage systems, school facilities, and rapid transit; however, unlike 
Detroit, their city’s economy stagnated and Philadelphia’s new char-
ter did little to curtail the Republican political machine’s control of 
political priorities or patronage positions. Challenges to the patron-
age network only delayed development projects, such as planning for 
the Declaration of Independence sesquicentennial celebration. Work-
ing within the political machine seemed the path of least resistance, 
as W. Freeland Kendrick’s 1923 mayoral victory demonstrated, and 
the chamber of commerce acquiesced to such pressures. The massive 
development projects associated with the sesquicentennial also fos-
tered both residential dispersion, which political and business leaders 
“rarely bothered to justify” (103), and corruption and graft. Ultimately, 
“most of Philadelphia’s upper crust had come to prefer boss rule 
to government inaction” (105); and “as the machine’s power grew 
unchecked, white politicians allied with local political bosses found 
it increasingly easy to ignore African Americans’ political demands” 
(108), and the same proved true for immigrant groups, laborers, and 
female reformers.
Atlanta faced a distinct set of political challenges; yet there, too, 
“elite businessmen … viewed government as an essential tool for 
developing a business-friendly city” (113). In order to secure electoral 
support for debt-financed public spending, business leaders had to 
secure support from newly enfranchised women as well as African 
Americans, who still voted in bond referenda despite widespread 
disenfranchisement in the state and region. Nevertheless, “successful 
white businessmen” (116) initiated all the public spending proposals 
and retained control of the city planning commission, which used 
zoning laws to mandate racial segregation, promote homeownership, 
and encourage residential decentralization. A different city but a 
familiar story.
The final chapter, “Businessmen’s Social Politics Beyond the Civic 
Welfare State,” shifts gears to highlight several projects that existed 
at the interstices of civic welfare and “welfare capitalism,” which 
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Amsterdam defines as “the provision of services ‘for the comfort or 
improvement of employees’ that are neither ‘a necessity of the indus-
try nor required by law’” (156). Company-sponsored sports teams, 
tracks, gyms, and movie screenings followed a similar logic to state- 
financed recreational facilities—to promote healthy and content 
workers. Amsterdam concludes that “businessmen’s experiments 
with welfare capitalism … sought to turn workers’ economic vulner-
abilities to employers’ advantage” by “leverag[ing] economic secu-
rity” to “make workers more dependent,” and thus more loyal to their 
firms (166). A short epilogue explains how municipal debt burdens 
exacerbated the crisis of the Great Depression and curtailed city 
unemployment relief. The civic welfare state, Amsterdam concludes, 
has proven necessary but not sufficient for building modern cities, 
fostering robust citizenship, or providing for impoverished urban 
populations; yet this ideal has continued to animate political debate 
for a century.
Roaring Metropolis provides a detailed description of how business 
elites parlayed municipal reforms into their own political power and 
then enacted “an opportunistic amalgam” (145) of public spending 
projects. Many of their civic welfare projects benefited the entire 
community, such as sewage and water systems, but most of their 
initiatives catered to the white working class, if not solely the elite, 
as was the case in school reforms and residential decentralization. 
More attention to the broader economic context—such as the sur-
feit of cheap credit, the soaring real estate prices and tax receipts, 
and the historical responsibility of municipal spending on infra-
structure development—might raise additional questions on the 
exceptional nature of these businessmen’s efforts. Given the strik-
ingly similar outcomes across these cities, one might also wonder 
whether national-level coordination—perhaps by the U.S. Chamber 
of Commerce, other trade associations, or the U.S. Department of 
Commerce—mattered. Or, was there an alternative model pursued in 
another major American city? Regardless, Amsterdam’s highly engag-
ing political and business history of urban reform and development 
convincingly demonstrates that business elites played decisive roles 
in shaping the substance, size, and scope of civic welfare projects, as 
well as limiting who benefited from them.
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